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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Self-incrimination-That section of the Subver-
sive Activities Control Act requiring individual members of the Com-
munist Party to register with the Justice Department violates registrants'
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 86 Sup. Ct. 194
(1965).
In Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board1 the Supreme Court
of the United States held that individual members of the Communist Party
of the United States cannot be compelled to register with the Attorney
General, as such compulsory registration would violate those members'
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The Subversive Activities Control Act of 19502 was passed by Congress
in an effort to burden and discourage the activities of the Communist
Party of the United States. The Act requires the Party to reveal the
identity of all its members to the Attorney General.' If the Party fails to
perform this duty, the obligation devolves upon the executive officers of
the Party,4 and in the event of their default, each and every member is
required to register.5 An individual accomplishes registration by filling
out and signing a standard registration form which states inter alia that
the registrant "hereby registers as a member of a Communist-action
organization." 6 The form is accompanied by a "Registration Statement"
which must contain, (1) the name of the Communist-action organization
of which the registrant is a member, (2) an enumeration of any Party
offices held by the registrant, and (3) a description of the duties performed
while in office.7 The Act further provides that the Attorney General, upon
reasonable belief that a certain individual is a member of the Communist
Party, may petition the Subversive Activities Control Board for an order
requiring the suspect to register.8 The Board then conducts a hearing to
1. 86 Sup. Ct. 194 (1965).
2. 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1964 ed.).
3. Subversive Activities Control Act §§ 7(a) and 7(b), 64 Stat. 993-995 (1950), 50
U.S.C. §§ 786(a) and 786(b) (1964).
4. Subversive Activities Control Act § 7(h), 64 Stat. 995 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786(h)
(1964).
5. Subversive Activities Control Act § 8(a), 64 Stat. 995 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786(a)
(1964).
6. Registration Form for Individuals, Form IS-52a, set forth in the appendix to the
decision, at p. 201 of 86 Sup. Ct.
7. Registration Statement for Individuals, Form IS-52, set forth in the appendix to the
decision, at p. 201 of 86 Sup. Ct.
8. Subversive Activities Control Act § 13(a), 64 Stat. 998 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 792(a)
(1964).
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determine whether or not the suspect is a "member" within the meaning
of the Act. An aggrieved party may appeal the Board's decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."°
In the present case, the Attorney General possessed evidence indicating
that petitioners were members of the Communist Party of the United
States. As neither the Party nor its officers had previously registered, it
was incumbent upon the individual members to do so. Therefore, the
Attorney General petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board for
orders directing petitioners to register. The orders were issued by the
Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's action, stating that
the petitioners' self-incrimination claims were premature." The Supreme
Court unanimously reversed, holding that to compel petitioners to register
as members of the Communist Party violated their fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and that circumstances were suffi-
ciently mature for the assertion of that privilege. Mr. Justice Brennan
authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.1 2
In reaching the reversal, the Court found that the case of Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board" was not apposite to the
present situation. In Communist Party the Board had issued registration
orders to the Party. 4 The Party interposed the defense of the self-incrimi-
nation privilege of its officers. The Court rejected this contention by a
5-4 majority. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, stated
that the assertion of the officers' self-incrimination privilege was prema-
ture because if the registration orders were otherwise valid, the Party
itself might choose to register;' 5 thus the duty of the officers to register for
the Party could foreseeably never be activated, since this duty arises only if
9. Subversive Activities Control Act § 13(c), 64 Stat. 998-99 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 792(c)
(1964).
10. Subversive Activities Control Act § 14(a), 64 Stat. 1001-1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C.
§ 793(a) (1964).
11. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 332 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
cert. granted, 381 U.S. 910 (1964).
12. Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Mr.
Justice Clark wrote a short concurring opinion emphasizing the fact that when the Subver-
sive Activities Control Act was initially proposed in Congress, the Justice Department
expressed the opinion that the registration requirements might offend the fifth amendment
self-incrimination privilege. Mr. Justice Black also briefly concurred and cited his dissent
in Communist Party v. S.A.C.B., 367 U.S. 1 (1961). In that dissent Justice Black expressed
the view that the Act offends the first amendment associational freedoms and is also a bill of
attainder.
13. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
14. The orders were issued pursuant to sections 7(a) and 7(b) of the Act, supra note 3.
15. The five justice majority in Communist Party v. S.A.C.B., supra note 13, held that
the registration orders to the Communist Party were valid and did not violate the first
amendment freedoms of expression and association. The Court also held that the Act was
not a bill of attainder.
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the Party fails to register.16 In Albertson the Court found no intervening
contingencies similar to those in Communist Party. The Board had issued
final registration orders to petitioners as individual members. Thus, peti-
tioners must either register and divulge incriminating information, or
subject themselves to criminal prosecution.' Therefore, the Court con-
cluded, petitioners were entitled to have their self-incrimination claim
decided on its merits before their duty to register became final.
Having thus arrived at the substantive question of self-incrimination,
the Court proceeded to find that the information which petitioners would
be required to divulge upon registration could lead to criminal prosecu-
tions under either the membership clause of the Smith Act,'" or Section
4(a) of the Subversive Activities Control Act. 9 Upon reaching the merits
of the self-incrimination claim, this conclusion was almost forgone, since
the Court held in Blau v. United States,2" that mere association with the
Communist Party presented a sufficient threat of prosecution to support
a self-incrimination claim. Furthermore, since the information required
of petitioners was so intimately connected with an area permeated by
criminal statutes, freedom from compulsory self-incrimination totally
excused registration.2
Finally, the Court decided that the "immunity provision" of Section
16. Communist Party v. S.A.C.B., supra note 13.
17. The penalty for failure to register is $10,000 or 5 years imprisonment or both for
each day of delinquency. § 15(a), 64 Stat. 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1964).
18. 62 Stat. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964). The Smith Act makes it a crime
to advocate the desirability of overthrowing the government of the United States by force;
to publish material implementing this advocacy; to organize a group of persons to advocate
the overthrow of government by force or to be a member of any such group, knowing the
purpose thereof. The penalty is a $20,000 fine or not more than 20 years imprisonment or
both. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Smith Act as proscribing only "advocacy to
action" as opposed to advocacy in the realm of abstract ideas. Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951) ; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1951). Similarly, membership in the
Communist Party can be punished under the Smith Act only if the accused is an active
member with a specific intent to bring about the forcible overthrow of government as
speedily as possible. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
19. § 4(a), 64 Stat. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783(a) (1964).
20. 340 U.S. 159 (1950). In this case, petitioner asserted the privilege against self-
incrimination while under interrogation before a federal grand jury.
21. This position was in response to the government's argument that the self-incrimina-
tion privilege could not excuse complete failure to register, but that it might be asserted to
excuse answering certain questions which might be particularly incriminating. This argument
was based on United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), where petitioner asserted the
self-incrimination privilege as a defense for failing to file an income tax return. The Supreme
Court affirmed petitioner's conviction in Sullivan, stating that the privilege might excuse
answering certain questions, but would not support a failure to file any return at all.
The Court distinguished Albertson from Sullivan by stating that: "The questions in the
income tax return were neutral on their face and directed at the public at large, but here
they are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities."
1965-19661
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4(f) of the Act22 did not provide petitioners with complete protection
from criminal prosecution, and therefore did not render immunity com-
mensurate with the self-incrimination privilege. The immunity clause
provides only that Party membership, per se, shall not be a crime, and
that the fact of registration shall not be admitted into evidence in a
criminal proceeding. The Court reasoned that since the immunity provi-
sion did not prohibit the use of the registration information as an investi-
gatory lead, compulsory registration could result in future criminal prose-
cution. Therefore, the immunity clause failed to meet the standard of
immunity as set forth in Counselman v. Hitchcock."
The effect of the Albertson decision is to administer the coup de grace
to the Subversive Activities Control Act. The great utility of the Act,
from the standpoint of the government, was that it required the Com-
munist Party to register and in so doing to submit a complete list of its
members. This revealed the identity of many communist-affiliated indi-
viduals theretofore unknown to the government. The requirement that
individual members register, in the event that the Party failed to register,
was of secondary importance because the Attorney General had to prove
to the Board, subject to appellate review, that an individual was actually
a member of the Communist Party. If the Attorney General possessed
enough information about an individual to convince the Board of Com-
munist membership, there remained little to be gained by forcing that
individual to register.2 4
Prior to the Albertson case, the Court in Communist Party v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Board25 held by a bare 5-4 majority that the
Board's registration order to the Communist Party was valid. This deci-
sion sustained the foundation of the statute, and the critical source of
information (i.e. the membership lists), remained intact. The success was
short lived, however. The government subsequently prosecuted the Party
for failure to comply with the registration order and the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that there was no criminal offense, be-
cause no one could register the Party without also revealing himself as a
Party member and thereby incriminate himself.26 The Supreme Court
22. Subversive Activities Control Act § 4(f), 64 Stat. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783(a)
(1964).
23. 142 U.S. 547, at 564-585 (1892).
24. The additional useful knowledge which conceivably could be gained by requiring
an individual to register, after an adverse finding by the Board, would consist of:
(1) Aliases used by the registrant in the preceding 10 years.
(2) Place of birth.
(3) Any offices held by the individual in the Communist organization and a descrip-
tion of the duties performed during the tenure in office.
See "Registration Statement for Individuals," Form IS-52, set forth in the Appendix to the
Court's opinion, at p. 201 of 86 Sup. Ct.
25. Cited note 13 supra.
26. Communist Party v. United States, 331 F.2d 807 (1963). The position taken by the
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denied certiorari. 7 Therefore, as a practical matter, the government's
access to the membership lists of the Communist Party had been fore-
closed prior to the Albertson decision. Only the requirement of individual
registration remained operative. Now Albertson has removed the last
weapon from the government arsenal.
Notwithstanding these developments, certain alterations in the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act could restore a great measure of its utility.
First; if the immunity provision were redrafted so as to provide complete
protection from all prosecutions to which the required information was
directly or indirectly related, this would overcome any self-incrimination
claim.28 However, this change, standing alone, would neutralize the provi-
sion of the Smith Act penalizing an individual for advocating action in
support of the Communist cause; i.e. any individual who desired to ac-
tively promote the Communist cause would merely have to register with
the Attorney General and thereby gain immunity from prosecution under
the Smith Act. However, this neutralizing effect could be removed by
simply eliminating the registration requirements for individuals. This
requirement has little utility to the government. The Attorney General
could then designate one known officer of the Communist Party (or any
other Communist-action organization) to register for the Party and com-
plete immunity from prosecution would be granted to this officer alone.
Thus, the complete membership lists of the Party could then be obtained
by the government. All of the disclosed members could be prosecuted
under the Smith Act at the discretion of the Attorney General, since the
self-incrimination privilege exists only for the benefit of the registering
officer and cannot be claimed for the benefit of third parties.2 9 Assuming
that Congress would be disposed to pass alterations of this nature, the
constitutional objections to the Subversive Activities Control Act 0 could
be eliminated and its fundamental usefulness preserved.
John F. Yetter
Court of Appeals in this case follows Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in Communist Party
v. S.A.C.B., supra note 13.
27. Communist Party v. United States, 377 U.S. 968 (1964).
28. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, at 429-431 (1955).
29. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370 (1951); United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141, 148 (1931).
30. In Communist Party v. SA.C.B., supra note 13, only Justice Black indicated that
the Act would be invalid even if the self-incrimination objection were eliminated since, in
Justice Black's view, the Act infringes the first amendment associational freedoms and is
also a bill of attainder. The remainder of the Court indicated that the Act was a valid
regulatory measure, controlling Communist activity exceeding the realm of mere speech.
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